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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
PHIL L. HANSEN, Attorney General of the 
State of Utah, · 
Plaintiff-Appel1ant, 
v. CASE NO. 
LEGAL SERVICES COMMITTEE OF THE 10784 
UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, the Attorney General of the State 
of Utah, appeals from a decision of the district court 
of the Third Judicial District, the Honorable Bryant 
H. Croft, Judge, ruling that the provisions of Senate 
Bill No. 4 as enacted by the 36th Utah State Legisld-
ture was constitutional and not in contravention of 
the provisions of Article VII, Section 18, of the Con-
stitution of the State of Utah pertaininq to the powers 
and duties of the Attorney General. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant filed suit in the district court of 
ih0 Thirrl T11rlkia 1 District on Tune 24, 1966, challi=mg 
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ing the constitutionalJty of Senate Bill No. 4 as en-
acted by the 36th Utah State Legislature, 2nd Spe-
cial Session which established the Joint Legal Serv-
ices Committee and legal advisor for the legisla-
ture of the State of Utah. A motion to dismiss was 
filed by the respondents and on the 4th day of No-
vember, 1966, an order was entered by the Honor-
able Bryant H. Croft, Judge, granting the respond-
ent's motion to dismiss and determining that the 
contention of the Attorney General as to the consti-
tutionality as to the reference legislature were with-
out merit. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant submits that the decision of the 
district court should be reversed and this court 
should rule that the provisions of Senate Bill No. 4, 
36th Utah State Legislature, Section 3, Chapter 7, 
Laws of Utah, 1966, 2nd S.S., are unconstitutional. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 24, 1966, the appellant, the Attorney 
General of the State of Utah, filed suit in the District 
Court of Salt Lake County, against Senator Charles 
Welch, Jr., Senator Richard V. Evans, Representa-
tive Felshaw King, and Representative Allan E. 
Mecham, Legislators of the Utah State Legislature, 
comprising the Joint Legal Services Committee of 
the Utah State Legislature. It was alleged that the 
legislation establishing the committee and provid-
ing for the office of leqa 1 advisor to the legislature 
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wa.s unconstitutional. The legislation wa.s enacted 
a.s Senate Bill No. 4 by the 36th Uta.h State Legisla-
ture (R. 5-6). The duties of the legal advisor a.re to 
prepare legislative measures, review legislative 
measures a.nd "give such legal advice and assist-
ance concerning any measure before the legisla-
ture" when requested to do so. (Emphasis added.) 
The Legal advisor is a.lso charged with the formula-
tion of plans for codification a.nd revision of state 
statutes. The Attorney General, in his complaint 
m. 1), alleged tha.t the legislation contravened the 
provisions of Article VII, Section 18, of the Constitu-
tion of the State of Utah providing that the Attorney 
Genera.I shall be the legal advisor for all state offi-
cers (R. 2). (Emphasis added.) The Attorney General 
contended tha.t the legislation usurped the consti-
tutional duties and functions of the Attorney Gen-
eral in acting as legal advisor to the legislature be-
cause the legislators were state officers. It is further 
contended that the establishment of the legal ad-
visor to the State Legislature usurped the statutmy 
duties and functions of the Attorney General. On 
July 23, 1966, the respondent filed a motion to dis-
miss the complaint of the Attorney General alleg-
ing that the allegations of the Attorney General 
were unmeritorious in that if his contentions were 
correct provisions of Article V, Section 1, of the Con-
stitution of the State of Utah providing for the sepa-
ration of powers would be violated. The respond-
ents also contended that the terms "state officers" 
applied only to executive officers and that the leg-
islature was free to hire its own officers and em-
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ployee~, mcludmg a legal advisor. Jt wa.s ±urtht71 
contended that if the Attorney General's position 
were correct his office would in effect interfere 
with the judiciary and that it was not the intention 
of the constitutional framers to so empower the At-
torney General as to preclude the legislature from 
employing its own counsel. Finally, the respondents 
contended that such construction was contrary to 
the "practice" in other states. The matter was held 
before the Honorable Bryant H. Croft, District Judge, 
on October 11, 1966, c:nd on November 4, 1956, 
Judge Croft entered a memorandum of the decision 
and a judgment ordering that the "plaintiff's com-
plaint is hereby dismissed". Judge Croft concluded 
that the Attorney General was not vested with com-
mon law powers, but that the separation of power 
provisions of the Constitution were not violated, but 
that the provisions of the Utah Constitution estab-
lishing the office of the Attorney General and defin-
ing his powers did not encompass legislative offi-
cers and that the leq]slature was not otherwise eY.· 
eluded from employing a legal advisor. 
Subsequent to Judge Croft's order the appellant 
perfected this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PROVISIONS OF SENATE BILL NO. 4, LAWS 
OF UTAH 1966, CHAPTER 7, SECTION 3, 2ND S.S. 
ESTABLISHINC THE OFFICE OF LECISL\TfVE AD-
VISOR ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN THAT THEY 
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CONTHAVENE THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE VII, 
SECTION 18, OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE 
OF UTAH PROVIDING THAT THE ATTORNEY GEN-
ERAL SHALL BE THE LEGAL ADVISOR FOR STATE 
OFFICERS. 
A. SEPARATION OF POWERS 
The respondents in the motion to dismiss in the 
trial court relied, in part, upon a claim that the At-
torney General's construction of Article VII, § 18 of 
Utah Constitution would do violence to the concept 
of separation of powers and be contrary to Article 
V, § 1 of the Constitution. The trial court apparently 
did not consider that argument valid, since it did 
mention that argument as a basis for its decision. 
Although no cross-appeal has been filed, the appel-
lant wishes to lay to rest any contention that Article 
VII, ~ 18, of the Utah Constitution, making the Attor-
ney General the exclusive legal advisor for the mem-
bers of the Legislature, would violate the concept 
of separation of powers. 
Article VII, § 18, provides: 
"The Attorney-General shall be the legal adviser of 
the State officers, and shall perform such other duties 
as may be provided by law." (Emphasis added) 
Article V, § l, of the Utah Constitution also pro-
vides: 
"The powers of the government of the State of Utah 
shall be divided into three distinct departments, the 
Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial: and no 
person charged with the exercise of powers properly 
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belonging to oue of these uepartments, shall exen:1sc· 
any functions appertaining to either of the others, 
except in the cases herein expressly directed or per-
mitted." 
The Attorney General in acting as a legal ad-
visor to the members of the Legislature does not ex-
ercise legislative power: to the contrary, he per-
forms the traditional function that an Attorney Gen-
eral has always performed, that of giving legal ad-
vice to public officers. At common law the attorney 
general sat with Parliament and was its adviser on 
legal matters. Holdsworth, A History of English La_w, 
Vol. 6, pp. 458-481 (1924); Beilot, The Origin of the 
Attorney General. 25 L. Q. R. 400 (1909). There is no 
conflict in the fact that the attorney general advises 
the members of the Leoislature and Article V, § 1. 
Legal advice and guid:ince is not the exercise of 
legislative power. The Attorney General gives h~s 
legal advice to the judiciary as well when called 
upon to do so, Article V, § 1, was never intended to 
create three completely autonomous bodies, but 
merely three separate branches of government that 
had made up the traditional governmental structure 
in this country.m Madison commented on the con-
cept in The Federalist, No. XLVII Vol. l, p. 331 (Cent 
L. Jed 1916): 
"* * ~' he [Montesquie I did not mean that these de-
partments ought to have no PARTIAL AGENCY in, 
or no CONTROL over, the acts of each other. Hi:o 
(1) The very argument respondent made on thi5 point w_ould mean no 
checks and balances and prevent government from workmg. Hand. ThP 
Bill of Rights. 
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111eamng, as his own words import, and still more con-
clusively as illustrated by the example in his eye, can 
amount to no more than this, that where the 
WHOLE power of one department is exercised by 
the same hands which possess the WHOLE power of 
another department, the fundamental principles of a 
free constitution are subverted. ':' * *" 
This court clearly recognized the same limita-
tions in Article V, § 1, in Tite v. State Tax Commis-
sion, 89 Utah 404, 57 P. 2d 734 (1936), holding that 
the Tax Commission could exercise certain quasi 
judicial powers, but not absolute judicial power. 
The court stated: 
"It was Montesquieu in his Esprit des Lois who 
crystalized the theory of separation of powers to the 
degree we have it in our Federal and State Constitu-
tions. But even here, as stated in Bouvier's Diction-
ary (Rawles 3d Rev.) p. 1114, 'The absolute inde-
pendence of the three branches of government which 
was advocated by Montesquieu has not been found 
entirely practicable, and, although the threefold divi-
sion of powers is the basis of the American Constitu-
tion, there are many cases in which the duties of one 
department are to a certain extent devolved upon and 
shared by the other.' In Brown v. Turner, 70 N.C. 
93, the court said, 'r Although 1 the executive, legisla-
tive and supreme judicial powers of the government 
ought to be forever separate and distinct. it is also 
true that the science of government is a practical 
one; therefore, while each should firmly maintain 
the essential powers belonging to it, it cannot be 
forgotten that the three co-ordinate parts constitute 
one brotherhood, whose common trust requires a 
mutual toleration of the occupancy of what seems 
to be a 'common cause of vicinage,' bordering the 
domains of each'." 
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Clearly, the simple rendering o± legal advice to 
members of the Legislature by the Attorney General 
does not encroach on the Legislative prerogatives 
and in no way transgresses Article V, § 1 of the Utah 
Constitution. Therefore, there is nothing that would 
prevent this court from saying that Article VII, § 18, 
makes the Attorney General the exclusive legal ad-
viser for members of the Legislature. 
B. THE PLAIN MEANING OF ARTICLE VIL 
§ 18. 
It is submitted that the plain meaning of Article 
VII,§ 18, renders the Attorney General the exclusive 
legal adviser to the members of the Legislature and 
that the provisions of Section 3, Chapter 7, Laws of 
Utah 1966, Second Special Session, purporting to 
establish the office of legal adviser to the Legislature 
is unconstitutional. 
Article VII, § 18 does not state that the Attorney 
Genearl may be the Legislature's legal adviser or 
that he is a legal adviser for state officers, rather, it 
specifically enjoined that he shall be "the" legal ad-
viser of the State officers. At the time the Utah Con-
stitution was promulgated the position of Attorney 
General was not without historical significance. The 
Act of March 18, 1852, established the office of At 
torney General of the Territory of Utah. This Act 
was upheld in Snow v. United States. 85 U.S. 317, 
(1873). However, in 1874, Congress repealed the 
prior law and the position was abolished. Compiled 
Laws of Utah 1876, p. 51. The Constitutional Con-
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vent1011 cons1dered the position, and seemed to m-
dicate the primary function would be advising state 
officers, and contemplated that other functions could 
be provided by the Legislature. Proceedings of the 
Constitution Convention 1895, Vol. II, pp. 1028-1030, 
pp. 1154. The only affirmative dutv the Constitution 
expressly obligates the Attorney General to perform 
is that of being "the" legal adviser to state officers. 
Certainly, in view of the discussion of salaries, etc., 
during the convention it could hardly be said the 
framers intended the Legislature to hire its own 
legal adviser. 
The trial court seemed to place great emphasis 
upon the contention tha_t legislators were not "State 
Officers," as that term is used in Article VII, § 18. 
Nothing in the convention proceedings supports 
that conclusion. The term "State Officers" is used in 
Article XXIV, § 12, to include legislators. That sec-
tion provides: 
"The State Officers to be voted for at the time of 
the adoption of this Constitution, shall be a Gover-
nor, Secretary of State, State Auditor, State Treas-
urer, Attorney-General, Superintendent of Public In-
struction, Members of the Senate and House of Rep· 
resentatives, three Supreme Judges nine District 
Judges, and a Representative to Congress." (Em-
phasis added.) 
Consequently, it cannot be profitably argued 
that the term "State Officers" was intended only to 
cover executive officers. The term "state officer" has 
in many contexts been held to include members of 
lU 
the Legislature. In re Anderson, l b4 Wis. l, 1 o~ N. VV. 
559; Brown v. Superior Court, 81 Ariz. 236, 303 P. 2d 
990; Jones v. Lockhart, 76 Ariz. 390, 265 P. 2d 447: 
Pitts v. Chilton County, 27 Ala. App. 364, 173 So. 94: 
Rich v. Industrial Commission, 36 Cal. App. 2d 628 .. 
98 P. 2d 249. It would seem to be an unnecessary and 
dubious play on semantics and constitutional inter-
pretation to contend that members of the legislature 
are not "State Officers" within the meaning of Article 
VII, § 18 and therefore, the Attorney General is "the" 
legal adviser to members of the Legislature. 
In McCormick v. Thatcher, 8 Utah 294, 30 Pac. 
1091 (1892), the court decided that the members of 
the Board of Trustees of the State Agricultural Col-
lege were state officers. The court carefully defined 
the elements of being an "officer" and did so in 
terms of the duties and powers exercised. This case 
was decided shortly before the Constitution Con-
vention and, it is submitted, would lend support to 
the conclusion that the term "State Officers," as used 
in Article VII, § 18, was intended to encompass all 
officials exercising the sovereign powers of the 
State. This necessarily includes members of the 
Legislature. Consequently, the plain meaning of the 
term "State Officers" requires that members of the 
Legislature be included within its scope. It seems 
inescapable not to conclude that the Attorney Gen-
eral is, by constitutional mandate, "the" legal ad-
viser to the members of the Legislature. 
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C. INTERFERENCE WITH CONSTITUTIONAL 
OBLIGATIONS AND PREROGATIVES. 
A substantial portion of the trial court's memo-
randum was directed to the question of common 
law powers of the Attorney General. Then the trial 
court concluded (R. 33): 
"The answer to the issue hereinvolved does not turn 
on what powers an Attorney General did or did not 
have at common law ... " 
Appellant agrees. Such was relevant below 
only on the question of separation of powers, an 
issue already resolved against respondents. The 
trial court determined that the Constitution, Article 
VII, § 18, did not prevent the enactment of Senate 
Bill, No. 4, Section 3, Chap. 7, Laws of Utah 1966, 2nd 
S.S. It is submitted the trial court erred. As has 
been noted Article VIL § 18 specifically enjoins the 
Attorney General to act as "the" legal adviser for 
"State Officers," and the members of the Legisla-
ture are "State Officers." 
The issue is, then, whether or not the Legislature 
may establish some other person or body to per-
form the duty and obligation the Constitution of the 
State vests in the Attorney General. The answer 
seems to be obviously not. Article VII, § 18, really 
contains two parts. The first makes the Attorney 
General "the" legal adviser for "State Officers." The 
second empowers the Legislature to legislate on 
matters concerning the duties of the Attorney Gen-
rC>rn l other than as leqa 1 adviser for "State Offir'Ars" 
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The Legislature may impose what authorized obli-
gations it will on the Attorney General, but it may 
not replace him with someone else as respects the 
Constitutional obligation to act as legal adviser to 
state officers. To allow the Legislature to do what it 
is attempting to do by Senate Bill 4, the first portion 
of Article VII, § 18 is effectively emasculated. The 
question here is not the power of an agency to em-
ploy counsel to conduct litigation. Rather this case 
involves the express power and obligation constitu-
tionally imposed on the Attorney General to act as 
"the" legal adviser. If the farmers of the Constitution 
had intended the Legislature to be able to substitute 
someone for the Attorney General as legal adviser, 
the language of Article VII, § 18, relating to the At-
torney General as "the" legal adviser could have 
been deleted and the Attorney General charged 
with performing only the duties the Legislature sav1 
fit to authorize. By not so providing, the framers of 
the Constitution must have intended the specific 
language to be the one area the Legislature could 
not change by legislation. Where the instant legis-
lation is directly inconsistent with the constitutionctl 
mandate it must fall as being in conflict with Article 
VII, § 18. If the Legislature were to be permitted to 
hire its own Attorney General, consistency and 
logic would likewise permit it to hire its own Gov-
ernor, Auditor, Treasurer, Secretary of State, and 
Judges. The intended encroachment by the Legisla-
ture into the executive branch of state government 
can not be permitted. The next step would be into 
thP iurlidal branch. Then. them wou kl hP no sPp?i 
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ration of powers. Then, there would be no democ-
racy. Instead there would be an all-powerful single 
branch of government bordering on the fringe of 
monarchy. Our constitution and courts are our only 
safeguards against a dictatorial legislature. Those 
Constitutional provisions must be honored and pre-
served. 
CONCLUSION 
The office of Attorney General of the State of 
Utah is an important constitutional office. Generally 
the duties the Attorney General must perform may 
be set by statute, although the Attorney General 
may have common law powers also. However, 
Article VII, § 18, requires that the Attorney General 
perform one specific duty, that of being the legal 
adviser to "State Officers." The members of the Leg-
islature are state officers. The Legislature has at-
tempted to have the obligations of the Attorney Gen-
eral performed by someone else. This is contrary 
to the express mandate of the Utah Constitution. 
Consequently, this court should reverse the tric.l 
court and rule that Sena.te Bill 4, Section 3, Chap. 7, 
1 .nws of Utah, 1966, 2ncl. S.S. is unconstitutional. 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Special Assistant Attorney 
General 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attornev for Appellant 
